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EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN CONCEIVED BY ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
The Uniform ParentageAct (UPA) guarantees equal treatment
under the law for all children. Section 5 of the Act assures that a
child whose mother was artificially inseminated by a donor will
not be deprived of the right to a legal father. Under the provisions
of the Act, the donor is insulated from legal-paternal responsibil-ity only if the recipient is married and her husband consents to the
insemination. The donor will not be shielded by the Act if the re-
cipient is an unmarried woman. California has adopted a modified
version of the UPA. In California. the donor's statutory immunityis significantly more broad; he is insulated from legal-paternal re-sponsibility regardless of the woman's marital status [Cal. Civil
Code § 7005(b)]. Ironically, the California version of the UPA ac-
tually contradicts the purpose of the Act. The statute does notuphold the rights of the illegitimate A.ID. (artificial insemination
by donor) child, since it completely severs the legal relationshipbetween the child and his natural father. Because other illegiti-
mate children enjoy the benefit of a legal-paternal relationshipwith their natural fathers, this Comment suggests that 7005(b)
violates the equal protection rights of illegitimate A.ID. children
and should be revised in conformance with UPA § 5(b).
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of artificial insemination as a popular 1 alternative
means of conception has spawned a conflict between the rights and
1. It has been estimated that 10,000 children were conceived by artificial insemi-
nation prior to 1971. Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 935, 938. Between 1978 and 1980 the estimates range from between 10,000 and
20,000 per year. Griffin, Womb for Rent, STUDENTr LAw., April 1981, at 28, 29; Cohen,Luttrel & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United
States, 300 NEw ENGtAND J. MED. 585, 588. Today, sources estimate that 1.5 million
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interests of A.I.D. (artificial insemination by donor) children and the
rights and interests of their parents. The absence of adequate gov-
ernmental regulation produces a host of real and potential problems
for A.I.D. children.2 Conversely, adults who turn to artificial insemi-
nation as a means of conception discover a system which is very sup-
portive of their needs. The process is uncomplicated and inexpen-
sive.3 Additionally, in California, the legislature has constructed a
legal barrier between sperm donors and A.I.D. children. Since do-
nors are exempted from legal-paternal responsibilities and are com-
pensated for their services, women are assured an adequate supply of
"superior ' '4 donor sperm. Although this Comment acknowledges the
need for comprehensive regulation designed to protect the rights of
more Americans will be born to artificially inseminated women by the year 2000. San
Diego Union, Oct. 11, 1983, § D, at 1, col. 2.
2. This lack of regulation is the source of many potentially serious problems. Do-
nors' records are kept poorly or not at all. The child will never know the number (one
donor has fathered fifty children) or whereabouts of half siblings. Cohen, supra note 1, at
587. The existence of unknown siblings is a source of anxiety for adopted children. Com-
ment, Adoptee's Right to Identity: A Ninth Amendment Approach to Sealed Birth, Cer-
tificates, 27 S.D.L. REV. 122, 125 (1982). Half of the child's genetic history will be
incomplete or unavailable. Cohen, supra note 1, at 588. The majority of doctors who
perform A.I. do not test donors to detect whether donors are carriers of genetic diseases.
Id. An A.I, child may not know until it is too late that she is a carrier or victim of a
genetic disease.
The California legislature, in 1983, made an attempt to regulate sperm banks. Assem-
bly Bill No. 1011 provides: CHAPTER 4.5. SPERM BANKS
1640. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to ensure the
health and safety of the public by developing regulations for the operation of
sperm banks.
1641. For the purposes of this chapter, "sperm bank" means any facility which
maintains human sperm for the purpose of artificial insemination.
1642. No person shall operate a sperm bank unless the sperm bank complies
with all the requirements of this chapter and the regulations adopted pursuant
to Section 1643.
1643. The State Department of Health Services shall adopt such regulations as
are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
1644. (a) Every person engaged in obtaining human sperm for use in a sperm
bank shall keep sperm from different donors in separate containers.
(b) Each container shall be labeled as follows:
(1) Date of donation.
(2) Name and age of donor.
(3) The physical characteristics of the donor.
(4) A complete medical history of the donor.
(5) Any known genetic diseases in the donor's immediate family.
A.B. 1011 Cal. Leg. (1983-84 Sess.).
This bill died in January of 1984. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY WEEKLY His-
TORY, A.B. No. 1011, P 604 (Thursday, Feb. 2, 1984).
3. The cost for a specimen of sperm can be as little as forty dollars. San Diego
Union, Oct. 11, 1983, § D, at 2, col. 4. The procedure is simple enough that a woman
patient has successfully performed the process with only a general explanation from a
medical doctor. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Cumberland County
Ct. 1977).
4. Most practitioners use the sperm of medical students or hospital residents. Co-
hen, supra note 7, at 586.
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all A.I.D. children, it will focus solely on the inappropriateness of a
California statute which severs the legal relationship between illegiti-
mate A.I.D. children and their natural fathers.
The legitimacy of A.I.D. children is an issue courts have grappled
with for years." Notwithstanding the married status of the mother,
some courts have held the child who is born to an artificially insemi-
nated woman to be illegitimate.8 There remains no universal agree-
ment regarding the child's status.7 Legislation has substantially re-
solved this issue in California. The California Civil Code provides
that the child of a married woman, inseminated with her husband's
permission, is treated as the legitimate child of that marital relation-
ship.8 A problem arises for the A.I.D. child of an unmarried wo-
man.9 Like the out of wedlock child conceived by sexual intercourse,
the A.I.D. child of an unmarried woman is considered to be
illegitimate. 10
Contemporary legal treatment of illegitimate children has signifi-
cantly improved. The common law has treated illegitimates quite se-
verely, and many statutes depriving illegitimate children of rights
enjoyed by legitimate children date back to early United States his-
tory.1 ' More recently, the Warren and Burger Courts have found
many of these laws unconstitutional.' 2 Additionally, the rights of il-
legitimate children are enhanced by legislation such as the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA), 13 now adopted in eight states, which purports
to assure equal legal treatment for all children. 4
5. Note, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935, 966-73.
6. Id. at 973.
7. Id.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1982).
9. In a 1977 survey of 471 physicians who practiced artificial insemination, 9.5
percent revealed they had inseminated unmarried women. Cohen, supra note 1, at 585.
10. Various definitions of illegitimacy include: a child born out of wedlock and not
legitimated; a child conceived before marriage and born after its termination; a child
born to a married mother in circumstances in which the husband could not have been the
father. H. D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITImACY, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 9-10 (1971).
11. Kellet, The Burger Decade: More than Toothless Scrutiny for Laws Affecting
Illegitimacy, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 791, 792 (1980).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 37-87.
13. UPA, 9A U.L.A. 587 (1979). The full text of the UPA appears in the Appen-
dix. State codes include: CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to 19-6-129 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1976 &
Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-257.74 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
40-6-101 to 40-6-131 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26 (1981); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010-26.26.905 (West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-
101 to 14-2-120 (1977).
14. UPA Commissioner's prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 581 (1979).
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Section 5 of the UPA addresses artificial insemination. Subsection
(a) assures legitimacy for the child when the married mother is in-
seminated with her husband's permission. 15 Subsection (b) absolves
the donor from any responsibility for the child when his sperm is
used to fertilize a "married woman."16
California has adopted the UPA into its Civil Code; however, the
legislature modified section 5(b). This modification extends the do-
nor's protection, absolving him from legal responsibility for the child
whether the recipient of the sperm is married or not.17 The legal
connection between the illegitimate A.I.D. child and his natural fa-
ther is completely severed by the statute. The statute creates a con-
flict between the equal protection rights of the illegitimate A.I.D.
child and the right of his mother to procreate.
This Comment will explore the equal protection rights of illegiti-
mate children born to artificially inseminated women. It will con-
sider the conflict between those rights and the right of unmarried
women to procreate. The Comment concludes that the California
modification of UPA section 5(b) [California Civil Code § 7005(b)]
is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection rights of
illegitimate children born to artificially inseminated women. In ac-
cordance with this conclusion, the Comment suggests that the Cali-
fornia legislature amend this statute to conform with UPA section
5(b).
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND SECTION 5 OF THE UNIFORM
PARENTAGE ACT
Depending on her husband's malady, a woman can choose to con-
ceive through homologous artificial insemination (A.I.H.) or heterol-
ogous artificial insemination (A.I.D.). 18 A.I.H. allows the husband,
who may be impotent but not sterile, to become the natural father of
his wife's child, since his sperm is used in the insemination process.1 9
A.I.D. involves insemination by the sperm of a stranger.20 American
15. UPA § 5(a), 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979).
16. UPA § 5(b), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1982).
18. Generally two classes of artificial insemination are recognized:
(1) Artificial insemination homologous [hereinafter referred to as A.I.H.]
utilizes the nonsterile husband's sperm. The inability to procreate by sexual in-
tercourse is attributed to impotency or some other physical malady.
Note, Artificial Insemination, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 302, 303 (1964).
(2) Artificial insemination heterologous [hereinafter referred to as A.I.D.] re-
quires a donor who is not the husband of the woman artificially inseminated.
Id.
19. Id. The child is a product of the marital relationship and is considered
legitimate.
20. Cohen, supra note 1. Most doctors (91.8 percent) do not allow recipients to
select their own donors. Id. at 586. Also, anonymity for the donors is carefully protected.
1064
[VOL. 21: 1061, 1984] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
courts have questioned the legitimacy of the A.I.D. child in a marital
relationship, and have come to no clear resolution.21 The UPA, how-
ever, substantially resolves the question of legitimacy and identifies
the rights and responsibilities of husbands and donors.
The UPA was developed to assure equal protection for all chil-
dren.22 The substance of section 5, which addresses the issue of arti-
ficial insemination, reflects this purpose. The married woman's child
is assured legitimacy as well as a legal father.23 The donor receives
immunity from responsibility for the child if the woman is married;
no such immunity, however, is granted if the woman is unmarried.
Thus, the A.I.D. child of an unmarried woman is not prevented from
asserting a paternity action against the donor.24
Section 5(a) of the Act addresses the issue of legitimacy. This
subsection, in part, provides that if, under the supervision of a li-
censed physician, and with the consent of her husband, a wife is in-
seminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband,
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived. 25 Since section 5(a) establishes a legal-pa-
ternal relationship between the wife's husband and the A.I.D. child,
the donor can be exempted from any responsibility for the child. Ac-
cordingly, section 5(b) provides: [t]he donor of semen provided to a
Id. at 589.
21. Note, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 935, 966-73.
22. The Act provides substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the
marital status of their parents which, the drafters believe, only fulfills the mandate of the
Constitution. 9A U.L.A. 581 (1979).
23. See infra text accompanying note 25.
24. At least one court has ruled that a sperm donor is the natural father of the
child produced. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rev. Ct.
1977). The court said, "If a woman conceives a child by intercourse, the 'donor' who is
not married to the mother is no less a father than the man who is married to the
mother." 377 A.2d at 824. In California, a father who fails to support his children is in
violation of the Penal Code. See infra text accompanying note 90.
25. The complete text of UPA section 5(a) provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him
and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the
insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of
Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the
physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All
papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the perma-
nent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere,
are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
UPA § 5(a), 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979).
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licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married wo-
man other than the donor's wife is treated by law as if he were not
the natural father of a child thereby conceived. ' 26 This immunity,
along with the attraction of compensation to the donor27 for his ser-
vices, assures married women a consistent supply of semen. How-
ever, the statute only provides the donor immunity if the woman is
"married." A donor whose sperm is used to inseminate an unmarried
woman will not be insulated from a potential paternity action. This
effect is truly consistent with the purpose of the UPA. A grant of
immunity to the donor would completely sever any legal relationship
between him and his illegitimate child. Thus, the child would be
foreclosed from any legal action against his natural father. Such
foreclosure would contradict the Act's goal of assuring equal protec-
tion for all children.
28
California Civil Code § 7005(b)
California adopted the UPA into the Civil Code in 1973 .29 The
legislature, however, modified section 5(b) of the Act. California
Civil Code § 7005(b) provides: "[t]he donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for the use in artificial insemination of a woman
other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of the child thereby conceived."30 The word "mar-
ried," which appears before the word "woman" in the original UPA
version, was deleted.3 1 The donor therefore is assured immunity from
parental responsibilities to the child whether or not the mother is
married. 2
This modification has an important effect on both the unmarried
woman seeking to conceive by artificial insemination and the illegiti-
mate A.I.D. child. Because. the donor is absolved from all legal re-
sponsibility to the child, unmarried women are assured a supply of
donor semen.33 Unmarried women now may easily choose to conceive
without engaging in sexual intercourse. However, the legal relation-
ship between illegitimate A.I.D. children and their natural fathers
has been completely severed.
Arguably, the California legislature did not fully understand the
26. UPA § 5(b), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979) (emphasis added).
27. Cohen, supra note 9, at 587. The Currie-Cohen survey showed that virtually
all respondents paid donors for their semen. The compensation ranged between twenty-
five to one hundred dollars per ejaculate.
28. See supra text accompanying note 22.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West 1982).
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1982).
31. Id.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
33. See supra text accompanying note 26.
1066
[VOL. 21: 1061, 1984] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
implications of this modification. The purpose of the Act3 4 and the
effect of this section directly contradict one another. Ironically, the
California legislature, consistent with the drafters, adopted the Act
with the desire to eliminate distinctions between legitimate and ille-
gitimate children and to provide a procedure to establish the parent-
child relationship without distinctions based on legitimacy. 5 Sever-
ing the legal relationship between illegitimate children and their fa-
thers does not serve this purpose. The statute not only contradicts
the purpose of the Act, but also violates the -illegitimate A.I.D.
child's right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. 6
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
The state's power to establish, protect, and strengthen family life
37
and discourage the birth of children out of wedloc 3 8 justifies laws
which deny illegitimate children rights otherwise afforded legitimate
children.39 The right of a state to promote these objectives has not
been challenged. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
invalidated, as irrational and unjust, laws which deny equal protec-
tion to the illegitimate child solely for the purpose of upholding these
principles. 40 Today, a statute which denies illegitimate children equal
protection will not survive Court scrutiny unless it has only a limited
effect on those rights.' 1
Ironically, California Civil Code section 7005(b) 42 arguably en-
courages the breakdown of traditional family life since it facilitates
out of wedlock births.43 Additionally, the statute totally forecloses
34. See supra text accompanying note 22.
35. CALIFORNIA STATUTES AND AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE, DIGEST OF STATUTES
ENACTED IN 1975, ch. 1244, at 344.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1970).
38. Kellet, supra note 11, at 794.
39. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967), the statute assured legitimate chil-
dren wrongful death benefits. Id. at 69 n.1.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 54-60. An Illinois statute which allowed
illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers was chal-
lenged before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976. The Court said the statute could not be
justified on the ground that it promotes legitimate family relationships, because actions
of men and women cannot reasonably be influenced by imposing sanctions on their ille-
gitimate children. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1976).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1982).
43. Because donors are free from any responsibilities for their children, an ade-
quate supply of "quality" semen exists for the single woman. The semen of high
achievers and Nobel Prize winners is readily available. See generally San Diego Union,
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any legal rights the illegitimate A.I.D. child may have against his
natural father.44 Beyond the apparent equal protection violation, sec-
tion 7005(b) ostensibly conflicts with both the traditional values
mentioned above and a well entrenched state policy favoring a fa-
ther's responsibility for his child.45
Faced with a constitutional challenge, section 7005(b) will en-
counter cases which vigorously uphold equal protection for illegiti-
mate children.48  The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 47 was first invoked to uphold the rights of illegitimate
children in 1967.8 Since then, the Court has consistently struck
down statutes which create insurmountable barriers for the illegiti-
mate child.49 Additionally, the Court has invalidated statutes which
do not totally foreclose rights but are unreasonably burdensome to
the illegitimate child.50 Moreover, the Court is intolerant of statutes
which deprive the illegitimate child of the right to support from his
natural father,51 a right the Court considers to be absolute. 2 Fur-
thermore, to survive court scrutiny, regulations which partially limit
the equal protection rights of illegitimate children must serve a sub-
stantial state purpose.
53
The United States Supreme Court has not encountered a statute,
such as California Civil Code section 7005(b), which completely
forecloses any legal relationship between a father and his illegitimate
child. However, the Court did review a statute which completely ex-
cluded an illegitimate child from wrongful death benefits. In Levy v.
Louisiana,54 the appellant, on behalf of five illegitimate children,
brought an action under a Louisiana statute for the wrongful death
of his mother. The statute assured the right of "children" to wrong-
ful death benefits.55 The trial court dismissed the suit.56 The court of
appeal affirmed, holding "child" meant "legitimate child, ' 57 and jus-
Oct. 11, 1983, § D, at 1, col. 2.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92.
46. See generally Kellet, supra note 11. This article tracks the evolution of equal
protection rights for illegitimate children.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
48.' Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967); Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1967).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 54-62, 71-84.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 54-62.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 69-84.
52. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). The Court held that there is no justifia-
ble reason to deny illegitimate children the right to support when that right is otherwise
assured other children.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
54. 391 U.S. 68 (1967).
55. Id. at 69 n.1.
56. Id. at 70.
57. Id.
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tified the decision based on morals and welfare and "because it dis-
courages bringing children into the world out of wedlock."58 The
United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court, distinguished this case from other equal protection cases,
involving social and economic regulations, in which the Court cus-
tomarily defers to the judgment of the legislature.5 9 He explained
that the Court is more sensitive when basic civil rights are being
violated.60 Douglas concluded that it is invidious to discriminate
against a child when no action, conduct, or demeanor of his is possi-
bly relevant to the harm done to his mother."' The statute in Levy
was later characterized as one which was unacceptable because it
erected an "unsurmountable barrier" between illegitimate children
and rights which are otherwise afforded legitimate children. 2
A statute may be invalidated though it does not present an insur-
mountable barrier to the illegitimate child. In Weber v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co.,63 a Louisiana workmen's compensation law rele-
gated unacknowledged illegitimate children to a status of "other
dependents" rather than the more favored "children" class. The
Court held the relegation of these illegitimate children to an inferior
class was violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."
In Weber, the Court developed a two prong test to evaluate the
constitutionality of statutes which allegedly violate equal protection
rights of illegitimate children. The test first requires an evaluation of
any legitimate state interest the classification promotes.6 5 The second
inquiry questions what fundamental personal rights the classification
might endanger.e6
Section 7005(b) is unjustifiable in light of the Weber test. This
statute arguably facilitates the birth of children out of wedlock,
which apparently contradicts traditional state interests.0 7 Addition-
ally, a very basic right-that of support-is proscribed by the stat-
ute. The United States Supreme Court recognizes the right of illegit-
58. Id.
59. Id. at 71.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 72.
62. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1970).
63. 406 U.S. 164 (1971).
64. Id. at 165.
65. Id. at 173.
66. Id.
67. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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imate children to support from their fathers.ea In view of the
significance of the rights denied the child and the apparent absence
of a legitimate state interest promoted, section 7005(b) would proba-
bly fail the Weber test.
The Illegitimate Child's Right, to Support
The Supreme Court is" unanimous in its condemnation of state reg-
ulations which deny illegitimate children the right to support from
their fathers when the state otherwise accords that right to other
children.69 The Court's position on this issue was first stated in
197370 and later unanimously affirmed in a 1981 decision.
71
A common law rule absolving a'father from a support obligation
for his illegitimate children was challenged in Gomez v. Perez.7 2 In
Texas, both at common law and by statute, a father has a continuing
duty to support his legitimate children.7 3 Conversely, the Texas com-
mon law provides that illegitimate children have no legal right to
support from their fathers.7' The appellant argued75 that a natural
father has an obligation to Isupport his legitimate children and that
her child was being denied' equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment because of the child's illegitimate status.7 6 The Court
agreed 77 and reversed the Texas court. The majority added:
A state may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by
denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. We therefore
hold that once a state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of chil-
dren to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitution-
ally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child sim-
ply because its natural father has not married its mother. For a state to do
so is "illogical and unjust."7 8
The Gomez. position was arned in 1981.70 In response to Gomez,
Texas enacted a statute, which required that paternity suits, initiated
to obtain child support, must be filed before the child becomes a year
old. This statute was challenged in Mills v. Habluetzel.80 The appel-
lant brought suit on behalf of her child to establish the appellee as
68. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
69. Id.
70.' Id. at 537.
71. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982).
72. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
73. Id. at 536.
74. Id. at 537.
75. The trial court held the natural father had no obligation to support his child.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court refused application
for writ of error. Id. at 536.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 538.
78. Id.
79. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 94 (1982).
80. Id.
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his natural father.8 The appellee asserted that the action was barred
by statute because the child was one year and seven months old
when the suit was filed.82 The trial court agreed with the appellee
and dismissed the action; the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed,
and the Texas Supreme Court denied discretionary review.88 The
United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice Relmquist, writing
for the Court, stated, "It would hardly satisfy the demand of equal
protection and the holding of Gomez to remove an 'impenetrable
barrier' to support, only to replace it with an opportunity so trun-
cated that few could utilize it effectively.""
Justice O'Connor further embellished the holding in a concurring
opinion.85 She dispelled any notion that a recent change in the stat-
ute from a one year to a four year limit was acceptable.88 Addition-
ally, she said the state has an interest not only to see that justice is
done for the child but also to assure that the primary obligation for
support of the illegitimate child falls on both natural parents rather
than the state.
8 7
The California courts agree with Justice O'Connor.88 Further-
more, a policy affirming paternal support responsibility for all natu-
ral children, legitimate or illegitimate, is clearly endorsed in Califor-
nia. The state has adopted the UPA into its Civil Code.89 Under the
California Penal Code, it is a misdemeanor if a father fails to sup-
port his legitimate or illegitimate children.90 Additionally, the state
will not bind a child to any agreement made between his parents
that compromises his right to support. 1 In a similar vein, a Califor-
81. Id. at 96.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 97.
85. Id. at 102. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan, and Justice Blackmun joined
with Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion.
86. Although Justice Rehnquist held that a one year statute of limitations was
unacceptable, he noted that Texas had increased the limit to four years. Id. at 100 n.7.
Further, he stated legislatures should be free to set limitations without fear of violating
the Constitution. Id. at 101 n.9. Justice O'Connor clarified that she did not read the
Court's decision as prejudging the constitutionality of longer periods. Id. at 106.
87. Id. at 103 n.1.
88. A California court asserted that it is important to identify the parent of an
illegitimate child so the father, rather than society, can be responsible for its support.
Davis v. Stroud, 52 Cal. App. 2d 308, 315 (1942).
89. See supra text accompanying note 22.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1983).
91. A California court has held that parents cannot, by their conduct or agree-
ment, impair a child's right to reasonable support. Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d
271, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1979).
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nia Health and Welfare Report addressing the issue of unwed par-
ents concludes, "The child is entitled to support from both
parents." 92
Although these factors represent a policy clearly favoring a natu-
ral father's support responsibilities toward his child, section 7005(b)
only undermines that purpose. The statute completely removes all
legal connection between natural fathers and illegitimate A.I.D. chil-
dren,93 depriving such children of the right to support. Because Cali-
fornia otherwise assures this right of support to all children, section
7005(b) would probably be found unjustifiable under the holdings in
Gomez and Mills.
Regulations That Survive Equal Protection Scrutiny
Regulations which deprive illegitimate children of equal protection
and yet survive constitutional scrutiny share at least two common
characteristics. First, the regulation does not place an insurmounta-
ble barrier between the illegitimate child and those rights afforded
legitimate children; an opportunity to mitigate the discrimination is
available.9 Second, the legitimate state purpose served by the regu-
lation goes significantly beyond strengthening family life.95
A Louisiana statute, which evidenced these characteristics, sur-
vived United States Supreme Court scrutiny in Labine v. Vincent."
The Court upheld an intestacy statute which limited the illegitimate
child's right to inherit from his natural father. The holding was
based on the state's interest in the prompt distribution of property.9
Furthermore, the Court recognized that the child's ability to inherit
92. A State Social Welfare Board study is highly critical of life styles which de-
prive the illegitimate child of a connection with his father. The study says in part:
The child is entitled to the support of both parents. This right should not and
cannot be compromised by either the unwillingness of the mother to identify the
father, or an unwillingness on the part of the father to assume his full share of
responsibility. There is long-standing legal and moral precedence to sustain the
support right regardless of whether the child is aided by public assistance or not.
Herein lies a basic conflict between the child's right and the claimed rights of
the natural mother who pursues the "new life-style" to have and raise children
without benefit of marriage. This conflict has nothing to do with the status of
women or their respective rights. Whether the mother herself may be able to
support the child now or in the future is not at issue. The plain fact is that a
mother who, having given birth to a child out of wedlock, refuses to identify the
father and to assist in efforts to enforce his responsibility to the child is, in fact,
failing to meet her responsibilities to the child.
STATE SOCIAL WELFARE BOARD, UNPLANNED PARENTHOOD: A STUDY OF UNWED PAR-
ENTS AND THE POTENTIALLY ENDANGERED CHILD (State of California Health and Wel-
fare Agency, p. 11, April 1974).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95-102.
95. Id.
96. 401 U.S. 532 (1970).
97. Id. at 538.
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was not completely barred by the statute.98 A father could acknowl-
edge his illegitimate children, making them eligible to inherit under
the statute, or the father could leave the children property in his
will.99
Similarly, a provision of the Social Security Act, possessing these
characteristics, survived Court scrutiny in Mathews v. Lucas.100 The
regulation provided that children of an individual fully insured under
the Act were entitled to benefits; however, illegitimate children were
only allowed benefits if they could prove dependency.101 The Court
upheld the provision, reasoning that the truly dependent illegitimate
children were entitled to support. The Court further stated that to
hold otherwise would burden the people with an extraordinary gov-
ernmental expense.Y1
The characteristics shared by Labine and Mathews are not readily
evident in section 7005(b). First, as previously discussed, the statute
arguably serves no legitimate state purpose.20 3 Second, and most im-
portantly, this statute irrevocably denies all of the child's rights, not
just his right to inheritance,10 4 support,105 or statutory benefits.' 06 Fi-
nally, anonymity 0 7 is ensured in virtually all A.I.D. cases; therefore,
a father is constructively barred from voluntarily conferring benefits
on the child. Because section 7005(b) neither serves any apparent
state purpose nor affords an opportunity to mitigate the harm visited
on the child, a court is unlikely to find justification for its discrimina-
tory effect.
THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE
One may assert that the justification for California Civil Code sec-
tion 7005(b) lies in its protection of a woman's right to procreate.
Arguably, if donors could be held legally responsible, as fathers, they
would not be interested in donating sperm for use by unmarried
women. This right has been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court reserves its strictest scrutiny for those cases which
98. Id. at 539.
99. Id.
100. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
101. Id. at 499 n.2.
102. Id. at 509.
103. See supra text accompanying note 43.
104. Labine, 401 U.S. at 533.
105. 401 U.S. at 537.
106. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1971).
107. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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directly affect the ability to marry and have a family.108 However,
when this right is only indirectly affected the regulation will be sub-
jected to a rational basis test.
Strict scrutiny was applied to a statute which required mandatory
sterilization for "habitual criminals" in Skinner v. Oklahoma.0 9 The
majority opinion noted that "marriage ahd procreation" are basic
rights.110 The holding, however, prescribed the application of strict
scrutiny only for mandatory sterilization laws."'1
Conversely, regulations which indirectly affect the right to procre-
ate are subjected to a rational relation test. This test has been ap-
plied to a law which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives; 1 2
a rule requiring pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity
leave;113 and a statute which made pregnant women ineligible for
unemployment benefits.11
If section 7005(b) were amended to conform with the UPA sec-
tion 5(b), the unmarried woman would probably experience difficulty
obtaining donor sperm.115 This change may limit her conception op-
tions, but it would not absolutely foreclose her ability to procreate.
Consequently, the statute, if challenged, would probably be put to a
rational basis test. The essential inquiry is whether it would be ra-
tional to assure all illegitimate A.I.D. children a legal relationship
with their natural fathers and simultaneously reduce an unmarried
woman's potential access to artificial insemination. In light of Su-
preme Court holdings which protect the rights of illegitimate chil-
dren 16 and traditional state attitudes disfavoring the birth of illegiti-
108. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See generally Donovan, The Uni-
form Parentage Act and Non-marital Motherhood-by-Choice, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 193 (1982-83); Kritchvesky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial
Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1981).
109. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). A Massachusetts law restricting
the availability of contraceptive devices was challenged in this case. The Court concluded
it was not rational to allow married people access to contraceptives and deny that access
to unmarried people. Id. at 447.
113. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). A group of preg-
nant school teachers challenged a rule which required them to take a mandatory five
month unpaid leave prior to the expected childbirth. The Court felt that the statute un-
reasonably burdened the basic rights of marriage and family life and struck the rule. Id.
at 640.
114. Turner v. Dep't of Employment Security of Utah, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). Ms.
Turner challenged the constitutionality of a provision of a Utah law that made pregnant
women ineligible for unemployment benefits for a period extending from 12 weeks before
the expected date of childbirth until six weeks after the childbirth. Id. at 44. The Court
followed La Fleur and struck the law as unconstitutional. Id. at 46.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 37-87.
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mate children,117 a court would probably hold UPA section 5(b)
rational.
CONCLUSION
California Civil Code section 7005(b) directly contradicts the
rights guaranteed legitimate children by the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and those rights intended to be pre-
served by the UPA drafters.11 8 An application of the standards of
review established to protect the rights of illegitimate children dem-
onstrates that this statute is unconstitutional. 19
The legal relationship between illegitimate A.I.D. children and
their natural fathers has been completely severed by section 7005(b).
Because anonymity is maintained among all the parties involved in
artificial insemination, the natural father is constructively barred
from any voluntary attempt to bestow benefits on his child. The bar-
rier erected between father and child is insurmountable, and statutes
which create these barriers are unacceptable under the fourteenth
amendment.
120
One may argue this statute is justified because it protects an un-
married woman's right to procreate. This argument must fail. A
compelling reason exists to assure illegitimate children the right to
support.1 21 Consequently, an unmarried woman's potential access to
artificial insemination must give way to assure this right.122
The statute does irrevocable harm to illegitimate A.I.D. children
while serving no significant state interest. Conversely, UPA section
5(b) fulfills the constitutional equal protection mandate for illegiti-
mate children.123 The California legislature should amend section
7005(b) to conform with UPA section 5(b).
JOHN M. DWYER
117. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
118. See supra text accompanying note 22.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 37-87.
120. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1970).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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